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Texas AkM University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Arvind Mahajan 
Department of Finance 
This study seeks to answer the question, "How does corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) influence corporate decision making?" It does so in two steps. 
The first step is the building of a theoretical framework in order to understand the many, 
vastly different academic theories on CSR. The framework that exists groups thoughts 
on CSR into three categories, which are as follows: normative stakeholder theory, 
shareholder wealth maximization theory, and strategic stakeholder theory. Proponents 
of "normative stakeholder theory" argue that, as a product of society, thc corporation 
should be held accountable to the demands of society, as seen through their various 
stakeholders. Believers of "shareholder wealth maximization theory" argue that societal 
utility is maximized as each unit of society seeks to maximize his or her own utility and, 
therefore, believe that the principles of CSR dictate that the corporation should be held 
accountable solely to its shareholders, which are the fundamental owners of the 
corporation. "Strategic stakcholdcr theory" is a metaphoric bridge between its two 
counterparts. Strategic stakeholder theory recognizes that a tradeoff exists for the firm 
between the immediate wishes of all stakcholders. For the long-term profitability of the 
firm, strategic stakeholder theory recognizes that both financial and non-financial 
stakeholders must be acknowledged. The recognition of this tradeoff leads to the second 
half of this study. 
The second part of this study picks up the debate on the relationship between 
CSR and firm financial performance. It is argued that this relationship is the underlying 
assumption that separates shareholder wealth maximization theory, which believes that a 
firm benefits society by seeking its own ends, and normative stakeholder theory, which 
believes that a firm does not benefit society by seeking profits. To add to the base of 
knov;ledge on this topic, a difference of means test is performed on companies that are 
in the DSI 400, a socially responsive stock index, against companies that are not in the 
DSI 400. A significant difference was discovered in the attributes measured. It is 
concluded that the DSI 400 serves as a valid proxy for CSR and further research using 
the DSI 400 is encouraged. 
1. Introduction 
Because of recent misdeeds at Fnron, Arthur Anderson, World Com, and others, 
the issue of corporate social responsibility has taken center stage in the media and 
political arenas. The neglect by corporate executives in the area of corporate social 
responsibility, or CSR, has resulted in several lawsuits, the two largest bankruptcies in 
history, and the deterioration of the public perception of corporate America. However, 
in this time of scrutiny, it is important to recognize that corporate social responsibility is 
a much broader and far-reaching concept than just the accounting transparency issues 
behind these corporate scandals. 
CSR encompasses not only corporate accountability, but it also includes the 
corporation's impact on the environment, the moral implications of its business model, 
and its investment into the surrounding community. Also addressed in CSR are the 
philantluopic giving of the corporation to the needy of our society, moral issues 
associated v ith international corporate investments, and safety issues associated with the 
corporation's various products. CSR encompasses the entire range of issues that deal 
with its relationship to society; it is the governing force that outlines this relationship. A 
lack of socially responsible corporations can have a detrimental effect by allowing the 
pilfering of societal resources by greedy corporate executives. On the other hand, 
limited economic resources disallow the corporation to meet every demand of society 
without infringing on its fiduciary responsibility to its stockholders; a responsibility that 
comes from the very property rights that underlie our free-market economic system. 
This leads to the main question of this study. Namely, does CSR influence corporate 
decision-making? If it does, how does it do so? 
While this inquiry may at first appear simple, this is not the case. In order to 
cffcctively answer this question we must first assess current academic theories that 
define what the relationship between a corporation and its society should be. In other 
words, what have others defined as being CSR? To do so, a thorough literature review 
was performed in which the theories were categorized into a three-tiered model that 
highlights the similarities and differences among the three schools of thought. Each tier 
or category of literature is thoroughly analyzed for its assumptions and what the 
assumptions dictate from a corporation in regards to CSR. From this literature review, 
the relationship between CSR and firm financial performance is discussed. In this 
discussion, a need for more research on a CSR proxy is discovered. In accordance to 
this, requirements for a CSR proxy are proposed and the Domini Social Index (DSI 400) 
is evaluated according to these requirements. The DSI 400 is a socially sensitive stock 
index, created and managed by the firm KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. , that has been 
used frequently as a proxy for CSR in academic literature. The study ends with some 
concluding remarks and a proposal for more research to be done that studies the 
relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance, using the DS1400 as a 
proxy for CSR. 
area of thought to the ideals behind the World Business Council of Sustainable 
Development. Moir's (2001) enlightened self-interest is comparable to our "strategic 
stakeholder theory". Moir (2001) goes on to say that those that argue for a moral 
approach to CSR "linked to social expectations" argue that "because business has 
resources and skills there is a quasi-moral obligation to be involved". This group is 
comparable to our "normative stakeholder theory". Finally, Moir points to the 
proponents of a neo-classical view of CSR. This view has been most readily identified 
with the works of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman who argues "Few trends would so 
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by 
corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
shareholders as they possibly can"(Friedman, 1962, p. 133). I refer to the neo-classical 
view as "shareholder wealth maximization theory". 
In addition to Moir, the works of Welcomer (2002), Martin (2002), Hillman k. 
Kiem (2001), and Donaldson k. Preston (1995) aid in establishing the boundaries of the 
three tiers. Each of these works highlights the differences between our normative 
stakeholder theory and strategic stakeholder theory. The use of the term "stakeholder" is 
owed to Freeman (1984) who defines a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can 
effect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (pg. 46). 
Welcomer (2002) groups stakeholders into two distinct groups, instrumental 
stakeholders and normative stakeholders. Instrumental stakeholders are perceived to be 
stakeholders whom the firm depends on to operate efficiently; while, normative 
stakeholders possess moral claims on the firm but do not exercise a substantive 
influence over the firm's operations. Welcomer (2002) argues, "the instrumental 
orientation explains firms as addressing stakeholder interests to maximize 
performance. . . by contrast, from the normative base, (the firm addresses) those 
stakeholders who are not perceived to have influence over the firm but have a moral 
stake in its actions" (pg. 252-3). Welcomer's (2002) instrumental stakeholders are 
equivalent to our strategic stakeholders. 
Martin (2002), Hillman & Kiem (2001), and Donaldson & Preston (1995) also 
make thc distinction between normative and strategic stakeholder theory. The figure 
below highlights all of these studies and parallels the terms given by each of them to the 
principles termed "normative stakeholder theory", "strategic stakeholder theory", and 
"shareholder wealth maximization theory". 
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For our discussion, I have chosen the terms "normative stakeholder theory", 
"strategic stakeholder theory", and "shareholder wealth maximization theory" with the 
belief that these terms most accurately describe the three general schools of thought 
surrounding CSR. The relationship of these terms to one another can be visualized as an 
old hanging bridge in between two cliffs. The bridge and each one of the cliffs represent 
a different view on CSR. This bridge metaphor will be referred to repeatedly to 
demonstrate the relationships between our terms, 
One of these cliffs represents normative stakeholder theory, which holds as its 
basic assumption the belief that the corporation owes its obligation to the society that 
The hanging bridge in our metaphor represents our "strategic stakeholder 
theory". It connects the two abstract ideas of normative stakeholder theory and 
shareholder wealth maximization theory by recognizing that a tradeoff exists between 
financial stakeholders (stockholders, debtors) and non-financial stakeholders 
(employees, thc environment, the local coinmunity, etc. ). Because this tradeoff is 
recognized, strategic stakeholder theory represents a conglomerate of ideas from both 
normative stakeholder theory and shareholder wealth maximization theory. Strategic 
stakeholder theory is the middle ground of CSR thought; it must be included in our 
analysis because of the realization that fcw would take either normative stakeholder 
theory or shareholder wealth maximization theory at face value. Likewise, strategic 
stakeholder theory also recognizes that meeting the demands of non-financial 
stakeholders may carry an intangible benefit, other than just an immediate return to the 
stockholders, which may be desirable to the firm. The bridge metaphor is beneficial to 
both understanding the relationship of these three ideas of CSR and to understanding 
how they relate to CSR's role in the corporate decision making process. This is 
described in more detail as a specific analysis of each tier is given below. 
2. 2. Normative Stakeholder Theory 
Normative stakeholder theory is what I have called Moir's (2002) "moral 
approach linked to social expectations", Hillman and Kiem's (2001) "social issue 
participation", and Welcomer's (2002) "normative base". This term refers to the school 
of thought that believes, because the corporation is a creation of society, it is responsible 
to society. Since the corporation is merely a creation of society, its interests should 
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(And) it is essential for them to adopt social auditing practices and report to interested 
parties as to what extent they have fulfilled the social objectives assigned to them" (p. 
36). Wilson (2000) argues that "new rules" (which include corporations taking more 
responsibility for societal concerns) exist in business as the private sector takes over 
functions traditionally managed by the public sector. Again, the justification for both 
Batra (1996) and Wilson (2000) is rooted in their ethical convictions for righteousness to 
society. 
In a paper commissioned by the Ford I'oundation to examine the study of 
business ethics in major U. S. business schools, Wood, Davenport, Blockson, and Van 
Buren III (2002) categorize the methods for teaching CSR (or as they refer to it as 
"corporate citizenship") into three approaches (citizenship is charity, citizenship is 
enlightened self-interest, and citizenship is transforming). Of these three, it is obvious 
that they advocate the third approach, citizenship is transforming, because of the 
attention it receives. The citizenship is transforming approach to CSR recognizes the 
importance that business plays in the life of a society. It is in this recognition that a 
responsibility to the corporation is derived from. The citizenship is transforming 
approach argues that if used "corporate involvement in community enrichment, social 
issues, and related issues would then be viewed as a necessary component of progress 
toward creating a just society" Q. 224). Again, one should notice the appeal for 
righteousness. 
Reed (2002) is significant and necessary in understanding normative stakeholder 
theory. Reed's main purpose is to argue that *'the combination of changing 
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circumstances and additional or supplemental normative principles can increase the 
responsibilities of corporations acting in developing economies" (p. 184). In doing so, 
Reed uses the theoretical writings of Jurgen Habermas (Habermas 1975, 1987, 1990, 
1993, 1996, 1999) to analyze the stakeholder claims on the firm. According to Reed 
(2002), the divisions of stakeholders (and their subsequent claims) are as follows: 
positive / descriptive stakeholders (with claims to truth which are justified through 
constative discourses), strategic / instrumental stakeholders (with claims of effectiveness 
and employ pragmatic discourses), and normative stakeholders (with claims of rightness 
and goodness which are justified through moral and ethical discourses) (p. 169-171). 
Because of the paper's focus, the author goes into more detail on normative stakcholders 
breaking the normative claim into the corporate obligations of ethics, morality, and 
legitimacy. According to Reed, the ethical obligations of the corporation relate to our 
understanding of the "good life" and are necessarily related to the specific sociocultural 
settings in which we have been socialized (p. 173). Moral obligations are universal in 
nature and refer to the norms to which everyone could agree (p. 173). Legitimacy 
obligations are also universal in nature and require that the actions of corporations must 
be based on "broad public discourse" and must develop and conform to a system of 
rights (p. 174). It is in Reed (2002) that we can see normative stakeholder theory broken 
down into its fundamental traces. The corporate obligations of ethics, morality, and 
legitimacy define the ethical justification used within normative stakeholder theory. 
The ethical justification inherent to normative stakeholder theory implies a great 
deal about CSR's role in the corporate decision making process. If a corporation is 
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"required to watch the interests of its stakcholders- employees, consumers, shareholders, 
the general public. . . . (And) it is essential for them to adopt social auditing practices and 
report to interested parties as to what extent they have fulfilled the social objectives 
assigned to them", as Batra ( I 996) claims, then we can assume that normative 
stakeholder theory demands that CSR plays an active part is corporate decision making. 
In particular, normative stakeholder theory requires that a corporation meet the 
needs of 
society as vocalized by a corporation's stakeholders. In essence, normative stakeholder 
theory argues that businesses should have a social conscience that should enter 
into the 
minds of it managers that creates a guideline for corporate conduct based upon 
stakeholder demands. Under this guideline, a corporation would have an obligation 
not 
to build a factory if doing so gravely harmed the environment, pay lower ivages that hurt 
its employees ability to make a decent living, or produce products (such as alcohol or 
tobacco) that were viewed by society as unethical. This obligation, again, comes from a 
corporation's obligation to society as seen through its stakeholders. 
2. 3. Shareholder Wealth Maximization Theory 
In the earlier mentioned bridge metaphor, shareholder wealth maximization 
theory is the theoretical "cliff' opposite to normative stakeholder theory. The 
underlying assumption of shareholder wealth maximization theory is that the only 
responsibility of a corporation, social or otherwise, should be to maximize its profits 
given the "basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodies in 
ethical custom" (Friedman 1970, pg. 33). This is vastly different from normative 
stakeholder theory, which believes that corporations have a vast array of responsibilities, 
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both financial and non-financial in nature. The justification for this single responsibility 
is two-fold. First, this responsibility is based off of thc classic economic belief that a 
society maximizes its utility when each member maximizes his or her own utility, given 
the absence of market exteinalitie. "Two hundred years of work in economics and 
finance implies that in the absence of cxtemalities and monopoly (and when all goods 
are priced), social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its 
total market value" (Jensen 2001). It is because of the reference to classic economic 
theory that this school of thought has been dubbed "neo-classical economics". The 
second argument for a single responsibility by corporate managers has to do with the 
ownership of the corporation. To explain this, I will use a metaphor. Suppose you were 
to open up your own bike shop. As your business, all decision-making authority 
of this 
bike shop would land on your shoulders. If you wanted to make money by selling 
cheaper bikes with faulty brakes or start selling beer and cigarettes in the back, you 
would have a right to do so as long as you obeyed the law and you accepted 
responsibility for such actions. Likewise, the corporation is a business owned by its 
shareholders. The managers placed in charge of the daily operations of such businesses 
are agents of these shareholders and have a responsibility to look out for their interests. 
It is further argued that if stockholders had wanted to invest their wealth in the building 
up of society, they have the opportunity to do so by contributing to charitable causes. 
' 
Because contributing to charitable causes is a more effective method for investing in 
society, it is assumed that stockholders invest in a corporation for one purpose, to 
make 
as much money as possible given the "basic rules of society" (Friedman, 1970) and 
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given the basic business model presented by the corporation Using these arguments, 
proponents of shareholder wealth maximization theory argue that the corporation's sole 
responsibility to society is to make as much money as possible given societal rules 
governing its operations and its stated business plan. In doing so the corporation both 
increases the total utility of society and fulfills it fiduciary responsibility to its 
shareholders. While normative stakeholder theory makes claims against the principles 
of ethics, morality, and righteousness (Reed 2002), shareholder wealth maximization 
theory makes claims against the property rights of shareholders and the principles of 
liberty and freedom of choice, which are inherent in our free-market economy. The 
literature within this survey examines this theory from several different perspectives. 
As mentioned before, neo-classical economics and, likewise, shareholder wealth 
maximization theory is most readily identified with the works of Nobel Laureate Milton 
Friedman. In 1970, Friedman wrote an article for the New York Times Magazine entitled 
"The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits". This article, in 
conjunction with his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, have become the corner 
stones of shareholder wealth maximization theory. In the article, Friedman argues that 
"In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an 
employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his 
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business'in accordance with 
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom" (p. 33) 
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An underlying assumption of this is that shareholders' only wish for a corporate 
manager is that he increases their wealth. I riedman addresses this by pointing 
to the 
fact that shareholders have the opportunity to contribute money to society by donating 
it 
to charity. Because this choice exists, it can bc assumed that shareholders entrust 
their 
wealth to corporations for the purpose of earning a return on their investment. If a 
shareholder wanted to contribute to society, he could do so more effectively by 
contributing to a charitable cause. Corporate managers should, therefore, assume 
that it 
is the wish of their shareholders to make as much money as possible given the 
corporation's business model and the "basic rules of society" and should not allocate 
corporate assets to charitable causes. 
Friedman's argument is also be used as justification for socially questionable 
companies. Cigarette companies obviously hurt society by producing and 
marketing a 
product that has been proven to kill thousands. It has been argued that cigarette 
companies should stop making money off of a product that kills. According to 
Friedman's logic, however, cigarette companies should not only continue to make 
money off of cigarettes but should make as much money as possible within the confines 
of the law, as long as they are truthful about the risks inherent in the use of their product. 
Cigarette companies exist because people have invested in them. If the owners of the 
business didn't want to invest in a business model that ultimately makes a product 
that 
has been proven to kill, they could invest elsewhere. Because we as a society 
have 
decided to allow the production and sale of cigarettes to be legal and because a group of 
investors has seen Iit to invest in the production of these cigarettes, according to 
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Friedman, the moral obligation of the cigarette manufacturer's managers is, 
therefore, to 
continue to make as much money as possible according to the 
business model that is 
described to investors (McCoy et, al. , 2000). 
Friedman (1970) also argues that CSR expenditures by a corporation represent a 
forced tax placed on the shareholders and argues that taxation is a 
function that we have 
reserved for the government, not for private corporations. 
Friedman's thoughts (along 
with those of businessman "Buzz" McCoy, Stanford University Senior 
Lecturer Kirk 
Hanson, and Stanford University Professor David Brady) on these issues can be seen 
in 
the November 2000 Stanford Business forum. In this frum, Friedman 
comments on his 
1970 work by arguing that people have ethics, not business; the ethical decisions 
of 
businesses should be made by the owners of the business (in the case of corporations, 
the shareholders), not the managers. In the case of corporations, it can be assumed 
that a 
shareholder wants his managers to make as much money as possible 
using the business 
model that the corporation has developed. If this were not the case, the shareholder 
could always take his money out and invest it in something else. This, 
of course 
assumes that the markets are efficient and that the shareholders have 
all of the 
information and expertise to understand the corporation's actions. 
Harvard Professor Emeritus Michael Jensen also comments on CSR (Jensen, 
2001). Along the same lines as Friedman, Jensen too argues for shareholder wealth 
maximization theory using a slightly different focus than Friedman's. Jensen 
ultimate 
goal is to argue that shareholders must follow a single corporate 
objective function. He 
argues that it is logically impossible for a corporation to maximize 
two objective 
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functions and the pursuit to do so weakens the agency relationship 
that exists between 
managers and the shareholders. He argues that this single 
objective function should be 
the maximization of the corporation's total market value (common stock, 
preferred 
stock, debt, and warrants) because economics tells us that societal utility 
is maximized 
when each unit seeks to maximize his own utility, which in 
the case of a corporation 
means maximizing its economic value as measured by the 
market. Jensen also argues 
that the advocates of stakeholder theory "refuse to make the necessary 
tradeoffs among 
these competing interests (referring to a corporation's many stakeholders) 
and they leave 
managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to 
make purposeful decisions" 
(abstract). Jensen admits that his argument, in reference to utility maximization 
theory, 
assumes that there are no market externalities (pg. 303) and that all goods are efficiently 
priced (abstract), 
Also mentioned in the literature review are the works of Bainbridge (2002) and 
Lantos (2002). Bainbridge (2002) argues against a document put forth by the US 
Conference of Bishops, which endorses stakeholder theory. In his argument, 
Bainbridge 
sites several quotations from Pope John Paul II, which endorse 
capitalistic economies 
and condone socialist activities. In doing so, Bainbridge (2002) refers to stakeholder 
theory as socialistic in nature (p. 32). Similarly, Lantos (2002) argues that CSR 
activities are actually unethical. He points to several theories on 
ethics. Specifically, he 
refers to shareholder property rights as negative or liberty rights 
and the rights of basic 
needs of society as positive or welfare rights. Lantos (2002) argues that 
"most non- 
utilitarian philosophers believe that liberty rights are more 
important than welfare rights- 
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they see us as having a much stronger obligation to 
refrain from interfering with 
people's freedoms than to promote their happiness or well being. 
. . "(p. 212). Lantos 
further expands his ethical argument against CSR to include all major areas or 
philosophy (utilitarianism, rights, justice and care) and concludes that altruistic 
or 
normative CSR activities by a public corporation are immoral. 
With normative stakeholder theory, we saw that the inherent 
assumption lead us 
to conclude that CSR dictates that a corporation yield to the 
demands society places on 
it. Because of these demands a corporation is ethically bound not to put 
its profitability 
over its social responsibility to its stakeholders. As we 
have just seen shareholder 
wealth maximization theory argues that a corporation's only 
responsibility is its 
profitability. The underlying assumption of this argument is that by 
seeking to 
maximize its own profitability it will leave society (and its stakeholders) better 
off. As 
has been discussed, this assumption stems from the classic 
economic belief that total 
societal utility is maximized when each individual unit, in this 
case each corporation, 
seeks to maximize its own utility. This assumption, which 
undcrlies the argument of 
shareholder wealth maximization theorists, is not held by normative 
stakeholder 
theorists. In fact, it is this assumption that ultimately divides 
these two schools of 
thought. Both normative stakeholder theory and shareholder 
wealth maximization 
theory seek to maximize the utility and well being of the greater 
society. They are, 
however, separated by this assumption by shareholder wealth 
maximization theorists 
and, therefore, disagree on the means of achieving the maximization 
of societal utility. 
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2. 4. Strategic Stakeholder Theory 
As v, as stated before, the definition of CSR can be represented by a hanging 
bridge in between two cliffs. If one cliff were normative stakeholder theory 
and the 
other were shareholder v'ealth maximization theory (two very different theoretical 
bases), then the bridge in between would be strategic stakeholder theory. What I am 
suggesting is that not only is strategic stakeholder theory 
the "bridge" that connects 
these two opposite ideas, but that there are several different versions 
of strategic 
stakeholder theory. Some are closer to normative stakeholder theory; some 
are closer to 
shareholder wealth maximization theory. While many different 
versions of strategic 
stakeholder theory exist, what identifies a theory as strategic stakeholder 
theory in this 
model is the recognition of a tradeoff between non-financial stakeholders and 
imancial 
stakeholders, and taking both of these groups into account when making decisions. 
Specifically, strategic stakeholder theory recognizes a tradeoff 
between different 
stakeholders and the legitimacy of their claims on the firm along with short-term profits, 
long-term profits, and risk. Overall, the focus of strategic stakeholder theory is 
the study 
of the tradeoffs between shareholders and non-financial stakeholders. 
There is a range of studies that I have grouped under the heading "strategic 
stakeholder theory". They range from papers that are almost normative 
stakeholder 
theory to papers that are almost shareholder wealth maximization 
theory. I took great 
effort at discerning which papers belonged in each of these categories. This was 
especially difficult with strategic stakeholder theory because of the range of 
views taken. 
However, there is one characteristic that defines a paper as abiding by 
strategic 
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stakeholder theory. All strategic stakeholders recognize a tradeoff between shareholders 
and other non-financial stakchohders and make their decisions in accordance 
to this 
tradeoff. Normative stakeholder theorists, I would argue, may recognize this 
tradeoff, 
but ultimately believe that the will of society takes precedence over the corporation's 
profitability. Shareholder v ealth maximization theorists, on the other hand, may 
recognize a tradeoff, but the will of this group is ultimately decided by what is good for 
the shareholders. They may take action to improve a relationship with a 
stakeholder, but 
only if such action can be directly traced to a creation of wealth to the shareholders (see 
Jensen, 2001). The distinction between shareholder wealth maximization theory and 
strategic stakeholder theory is the unwillingness of the latter to allocate corporate 
resources to benefit non-financial stakeholders. Shareholder wealth maximization 
theory does not warrant such an allocation unless an observable benefit can 
be traced to 
the shareholder, On strategic stakeholder theory, I-lillman and Kiem (2001) write: 
"Building better relations with primary stakeholders like employees, customers, 
suppliers, and communities (Freeman, 1984) could lead to increased financial 
returns by helping firms develop intangible but valuable assets which can 
be 
sources of competitive advantage. For example, investing in stakeholder 
relations may lead to customer or supplier loyalty, reduced turnover among 
employees, or improved firm reputation. These valuable assets in turn 
lead to a 
positive relationship between stakeholder management and shareholder value 
wherein effective stakeholder management leads to improved financial 
performance. " 
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The "intangible but valuable" assets that Hillman and Kiem (2001) discuss are the 
motivation for taking action from a strategic stakeholder theory perspective. 
Shareholder wealth maximization theory would be reluctant to pursue such assets unless 
they were thought to attribute some direct financial gain to financial stakeholders. There 
is obviously a fine line between these two groups in this respect but, again, the 
difference comes from the willingness of advocates of strategic stakeholders theory to 
recognize and act on the tradeoff they believe to exist between financial and non- 
financial stakeholders. 
A shareholder wealth maximization theorist would never consider donating company 
funds to a cause that would in no way help the standing of the company, but a strategic 
stakeholder theorist would consider the implications of this donation and consider what 
would happen to the stakeholder if they did not donate. Perhaps, a lot of people depend 
on this cause and it would go under v, ithout a little boost. On the other side, while a 
normative stakeholder theorist would never consider increasing the emissions of its 
factories, the strategic stakeholder theorist would consider how much money the 
company would save in doing so and consider what this money could be used for. It 
may be that the company could increase the emissions of its factories by a negligible 
amount and then use this money to invest in technologies to increase pollution 
abatement even further. Again, the group of papers that I have grouped under the 
heading strategic stakeholder theory all share the distinction of weighing each decision's 
implications on both shareholders and other non-financial stakeholders. 
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As was discussed before, there are a great deal of studies that are 
grouped under 
the heading "strategic stakeholder theory". Following 
the bridge metaphor, some of 
them are closer to normative stakeholder theory while 
others more closely represent 
shareholder wealth maximization theory. All, however, depend 
on the tradeoff between 
financial and non-financial stakeholders and choose to 
act according to it. Below is a 
review of the papers that have been termed strategic stakeholder theory. 
They have been 
group according to one of the following sub-headings: 
sustainable development, triple 
bottom line, general theory, strategic stakeholder theory 
models, and empirical studies, 
This v, as done in an effort to group similar arguments 
together. 
2. 4. 1. Sustainable Development & Triple Bottom Line 
Literature on sustainable development and literature on the 
triple bottom line are 
similar to normative stakeholder theory. However, 
v. hat separates them both from 
normative stakeholder theory is that they leave room for 
the will of the shareholders to 
be placed over the will of the general society. In other words, 
they look at the tradeoffs 
between shareholders and other stakeholders and act in 
accordance to this tradeoff. 
Sustainable development and the triple bottom line approach 
are, also, both very similar 
to each other. Sustainable development is defined by 
the World Commission on 
Environment and Development as "economic development that 
meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their 
own needs" (Epstein and Roy, 2001). The triple bottom line approach says 
that a 
corporation should be held to three bottom lines: financial, 
environmental, and societal. 
They are similar in our context because both start from 
a normative base but move into 
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looking at the tradeoffs betv, een shareholders and 
stakeholders. The papers surveyed on 
sustainable development include a literature reviev; of studies that show 
that corporate 
social responsibility can cause firm prosperity (Conference Board, 1999), a presentation 
of the idea of natural capitalism in which steps are taken so that natural 
resources are 
valued properly for the services they provide (Lovins, Lovins, and Hawken, 
1999), an 
article highlighting the one-day business conference entitled 
"Business Performance and 
Corporate Social Responsibility" where it was stressed that 
business and society must 
co-exist in order to achieve success (Stainer, 2002), an analysis of the drivers of 
sustainability (Epstein and Roy, 2001), and an agenda for increasing sustainability 
through the markets (Holliday and Pepper, 2001). The papers surveyed on the triple 
bottom line include a survey by Sandra Waddock that illustrates 
the means stakeholders 
are using to influence corporations and provides a commentary 
on the triple bottom line 
(Waddock, 2000) and an analysis on the changing business environment in China 
and 
how new opportunities for the triple bottom line are present 
there (Young and MacRae, 
2002). 
2. 4. 2. General Theory 
This survey also includes many papers that deal with various 
theoretical aspects 
of strategic stakeholder theory. These are important because they provide 
a basis for 
understanding strategic stakeholder theory as a whole. Included 
in this group is Jeff 
Frooman's 1999 study over stakeholder influence strategies. In this, Frooman 
uses 
resource dependency theory to develop a resources relationship 
in which the strategy 
used by the stakeholder (direct withholding, direct usage, indirect 
withholding, and 
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indirect usage) is determined by its relationship to the firm. This paper is included in the 
strategic stakeholder theory because it is imperative for the manager to know how 
the 
stakeholder will try to influence the corporalion when accessing the tradeoff that exists. 
Also included in this section is a paper by Hess, Rogovsky, and Dunfee (2002), which 
discusses the eniergence of a new form of CSR through strategic corporate initiatives. 
These CSR actions are distinct from their predecessors because they are more connected 
to the core values of the firm, more linked to the core competencies of the firm, and are 
analyzed and communicated to the firm's stakeholders. In this manner, the CSR actions 
are strategic in that they are done in a manner to promote the welfare of both the 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
2. 4. 3. Strategic Stakeholder Theory Models 
This sections highlights two academic models that have been grouped in 
strategic stakeholder theory because of their attempts to understand the tradeoffs present 
within CSR. The first model is Martin's (2002) "Virtue Matrix". The purpose of this 
model is to understand the motivation for undertaking CSR; for our purposes, it models 
strategic stakeholder theory against normative stakeholder theory in order to 
understand 
the distinction between the two. This model is a two-by-two matrix that is separated 
into the "frontier" (the upper two quadrants) and the "civil foundation" (the bottom two 
quadrants) (see figure below). The "frontier" houses CSR motivations that are 
originally intrinsically motivated. The "frontier" is separated into the "strategic 
frontier" 
and the "structural frontier". The "strategic frontier" houses actions that are done 
because they help to increase the value to shareholders and benefit society. The 
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"structural frontier" houses actions that decrease shareholder value. Below the frontier 
is the *'civil foundation" which houses CSR activities that are a part of a society's norms, 
expectations, or laws. The "civil foundation" is separated into actions in which firms 
enter either by "choice'* (they choose to acknowledge society's norms and expectations) 
or by "compliance" (they are compelled to take a CSR action through legislation). In 
"The Virtue Matrix", the "strategic frontier" and the "civil foundation" entered into by 
"choice" belong to strategic stakeholder theory. Firms enter into these decisions by 
considering the force of their actions on stakeholders and the effect of those actions on 
shareholder wealth. Likewise, the "structural frontier" and the "civil foundation" 
entered into by compliance are normative stakeholder theory principles because these 
actions do not add value to the shareholder but provide for society; they are, therefore, 





Figure: 'Virtue Martini" 
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The next model is more cognitive than visual. 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) 
present a model on the CSR activity of embodying products 
with socially desirable 
attributes or characteristics. In this context, they argue 
that CSR can be seen in a 
supply-demand model in which the demand for CSR activities 
rests with consumers and 
CSR is, therefore, supplied by the firm. Thus, consumer 
demand for CSR attributes is 
determined by several characteristics of the product. The price of 
the good with the 
CSR attribute is said to negatively effect demand, while 
advertising by the firm, income 
of the consumer, and price of substitute goods are all said to 
positively effect the 
demand of the consumer for the CSR attribute. Tastes and 
demographics of the 
consumer base are said to influence demand but do so 
in an indeterminate way. On the 
supply side, higher capital expenditures, 
higher-cost materials and services, and higher 
wages/ benefits and additional workers are all inputs 
necessary to increase the supply of 
CSR attributes. With the increased demand comes increased 
revenue, but with the 
increased supply comes increased costs. Because CSR, in this 
context, can exist within 
a supply-demand model, Mc Williams and Siegel argue 
that, in this context, there exists 
a maximum level of CSR where the increased level of revenue equals 
the higher cost. 
McWilliams and Siegel argue that, at this point, a firm that 
produces a product with CSR 
attributes is just as profitable as a firm that produces a product without 
CSR attributes. 
In this manner it is said that CSR and CFP have a 
neutral relationship. This paper is 
obviously a strategic stakeholder theory paper in nature, 
for it attempts to model the 
tradeoff that exists between the demands of society and the supply 
that comes from the 
shareholders. While this model looked at only one instance 
of CSR (namely, products 
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with CSR attributes), it provides encouragement that the tradeoffs 
that exist within CSR 
can be understood within a rational framework. It is 
through this attempt that CSR can 
be seen and understood within the outlines of economics and 
understood in a rational 
analysis rather than an appeal to ethics (as in normative stakeholder 
theory) or an appeal 
to liberty (as in shareholder wealth maximization theory). 
2. 4. 4. Empirical Studies of CSR 
The previous subsection ended with an analysis of the 
McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) model. This model attempted to understand CSR within a logical 
framework. 
The studies in this subsection take this a step further. 
These studies use empirical 
analysis to not only measure CSR, but to also measure the 
effect CSR has on the firm. It 
is in this manner that we are better able to understand 
the tradeoffs that exist within 
strategic stakeholder theory. This subsection is the 
last group of strategic stakeholder 
theory studies. From the base of previous empirical studies, 
we will be able to add to 
the breadth of knowledge by performing our own CSR empirical 
study in order to 
further the advancement of future research into the relationship 
CSR has on a 
corporation. 
The chief question that the empirical analyses in this survey 
seek to answer is, 
"What is the relationship of a firm's corporate social responsibility 
and its financial 
performance?" The answer to this question has many implications 
on the operational 
use of CSR. As was discussed before, the main underlying 
distinction between 
normative stakeholder theory and shareholder wealth 
maximization theory is the 
assumption by advocates of shareholder wealth maximization theory 
that by seeking its 
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maximum profitability, a corporation is leaving society 
better off. The validiiy of this 
assumption is the chief subject ot' inquiry in empirical research done 
on the relationship 
between CSR and firm financial performance. One implication 
of this assumption is 
that because a firm benefits society by seeking its 
own maximum financial performance, 
firm financial performance and CSR should be positively 
related. In other words, those 
firms that are highly profitable should be the most 
socially responsible according to 
shareholder wealth maximization theory. Likewise, 
those firms that are not profitable 
would be the least socially responsible. The inquiry 
into the validity of this assumption 
would therefore create a link between shareholder 
wealth maximization theory and 
normative stakeholder theory. Because of this possible link, 
these studies are grouped 
under strategic stakeholder theory. 
The issue of how to measure CSR is a concern that must be 
addressed in any 
empirical investigation on this topic. It is also the 
subject of the last part of this study in 
which the validity of a commonly used proxy, inclusion in 
the Domini Social Index 
(DSI) 400, is tested for validity and meaning. The DSI 400 will be 
discussed in detail 
shortly. 
The CSR proxies used in this survey are each characteristically 
different. It is, 
therefore, important for this study to identify these 
proxies and compare their strengths 
and weaknesses. The proxies in this survey can be 
broken into three groups. The first 
group contains proxies that attempt to 
measure specific aspects of CSR and use this as a 
proxy for the firm's overall level of CSR. The 
assumption here is that a firm's 
performance in one area of CSR is indicative of the 
firm's general level of CSR. Some 
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CSR measures that are generally used in this manner are measurements related to a 
firm's community relations, employee relations, environmental actions, product 
characteristics, treatment of women and minorities, and the lack of non-CSR activities 
such as corruption, military contracting, etc. Kumar, Lamb, and Wokutch (2002); 
Porras, Griswold, and Scott (2002); and Lee and Ng (2002) are all examples of studies 
that use a single aspect of CSR as a proxy for the firm's general level of CSR. 
Kumar, Lamb, and Wokutch (2002) indirectly studied the effects on financial 
performance of companies that had equity interests in South Africa during the apartheid 
boycott (a choice by some companies that v ent against their CSR). The authors use a 
company's equity presence in South Africa at thc time of Nelson Mandela's speech, 
which effectively ended the call for the South African boycott, as a signal of non-CSR 
activity. Kumar, Lamb, and Wokutch (2002) showed that after Mandela's speech ended 
South Africa sanctions, there was an influx of institutional ownership in stocks that had 
equity interests in South Africa. This proves that institutional investors surged 
to buy 
these stocks when sanctions were lifted. It can, therefore, be assumed that 
institutional 
investors avoided these stocks and effectively penalized them for not being socially 
responsible. Furthermore, it is shown that stocks with equity interests in South 
Africa 
when sanctions ended were shown to have positive abnormal returns. However, 
the 
stocks that had previously announced a withdrawal from South Africa did 
not show any 
significant positive abnormal returns. 
Porras, Griswold, and Scott (2002) attempt to measure the effect hiring 
minorities has on a company's prosperity and use a company's presence on 
Fortune 's 
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"50 Best Companies for Minorities" as a screen for CSR The results presented were 
inconclusive. Jones and Murrell (2001) use Working Mother Magazine in the same 
fashion, but in this study they use the CSR measure as a general signal for CSR. The 
results of this study show that firms introduced to the list for the first time did indeed 
exhibited significant, positive abnormal returns. In addition, thc most profound 
effects 
v ere seen in firms listed on the NASDAQ (v'hich the study notes has high liquidity and 
less intensive information processing compared to the NYSE). Also included in this 
study is Lee and Ng (2002), which uses Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) as a measure of corruption. CPI measures a nation's overall 
level of corruption. By using this as a proxy, Lee and Ng assume that a corporation 
within a particular country is destined to descend or ascend to its home 
country's normal 
level of corruption. In this manner, Lee and Ng (2002) empirically measure the 
association of the CPI index to Iirm value. In doing so, CPI represents Lee and Ng's 
(2002) CSR proxy. The results of the this study showed that the value of a firm (in the 
form of its P/E and P/B multiples) is found to be is positively associated to a good CPI 
ranking of the firm's host country. 
The second group of CSR proxies is made of proxies that are specific to a single 
industry. An example of this is Simpson and Kohers (2002). This paper is a study of 
the relationship of CSR to corporate financial performance specific to the commercial 
banking industry. Likewise, the paper uses a CSR proxy that is only applicable 
to the 
banking industry. This proxy comes from the Community Reinvestment Act 
of 1977, 
which mandates that a bank fulfill the credit needs of their local communities. In 
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addition, this act puts forth a ranking system to measure how well banks comply with 
this law. Simpson and Kohers (2002) use ihis ranking system as proxy for CSR in order 
to measure the financial performance of higher ranked banks versus the tmancial 
perl'ormance of lower ranked banks. Simpson and Kohers (2002) found a positive 
correlation between firm financial performance and CSR. 
In addition to specific CSR measures is a third type of CSR proxy; overall CSR 
proxies that attempt to accumulate the many facets of CSR into one measure. This is 
done in an attempt to compare companies from an overall CSR perspective and to 
analyze the general effect CSR has on a company. The most widely used overall CSR 
measures are the scores given by the firm KLD Research & Analytics, Inc (formerly 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co. , Inc. ). Currently, KLD scores approximately g00 
firms (including those in the S&P 500) in the areas of community relations, employee 
relations, environment, product characteristics, and treatment of women and minorities 
on a scale from — 2 (major concern) to +2 (major strength). KLD also screens the 
companies they analyze for activities they deem to be solely undesirable. These 
activities have included military contracting, participation in nuclear power, profiting off 
of the sale of alcohol or tobacco, gambling, involvement in South Africa, and non-U. S. 
concerns over investment in Burma and Mexico. KLD only provides negative scores in 
these areas. So, KLD scores these firms on a range of — 2 (major concern) to 0 (no 
concern). 
The following studies are a sample of the studies in the academic press that have 
used KLD's scores: Waddock and Graves (1997), Hillman and Kiem (2001), and Ruf, 
Muralidhar, Brown. Janney, and Paul (2001), among others. Using this data, Waddock 
and Graves (1997) found a positive relationship between financial performance and 
CSR. Hillman and Kiem (2001) divided CSR into issues they deemed as "stakeholder 
management" (product, employee relations, diversity, community relations, and the 
enviroruucnt) and "social issue participation" (alcohol/ gambling/ tobacco, military 
contracting, nuclear power, non-U. S. operations, and other). They found positive 
relationship with financial performance among stakeholder management issues 
and a 
negative relationship among social issue participation issues. Ruf, Muralidhar, 
Brown, 
Janney, and Paul (2001) found that a change in CSR and growth are positively related. 
However, the positive relation between change in CSR and profitability is not significant 
and comes later. 
In addition to its CSR scores, KLD also produces an index of stocks that have 
notably high CSR. This market-weighted index is called the Domini Social Index (DSI 
400). Inclusion in the DSI 400 is used as a screen for CSR in many studies including 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000), which assigned each company they analyze with a 
scoring of wither a "I" (if included in the DSI 400) or a "0*' (if not included in the DSI 
400). In doing so, McWilliams and Siegel discovered a neutral relationship between 
CSR and firm financial performance when R&D expenditures are controlled for. The 
DSI 400 is the main topic of the empirical analysis that follows this section. So, more 
will be said on KLD and the DS14001ater in the next section of this study. 
The French equivalent to the KLD, the AReSE, scores French companies in the 
areas of employee relations, the environment, shareholder relations, product quality, 
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relations with customers, and community on a scale from 1(backv. ard) to 5 (pioneer). 
These scores were used in D'Arcimoles and Trebucq (2002) to study the CSR/CFP 
empirical association in France. They found that their results could not support 
the 
hypothesis that higher performance leads to better CSR; it found that (conirary to what 
was hypothesized) better CSR leads to a lower return on equity. When RkD is 
controlled for, the relationship between CSR and financial performance becomes 
neutral. 
The role of CSR in the corporate decision making process under strategic 
stakeholder theory has yet to be addressed. Because strategic 
stakeholder theory 
contains many ideas from both normative stakeholder theory and 
shareholder wealth 
maximization theory, the role of CSR in corporate decision-making under strategic 
stakeholder theory depends a great deal upon the perspective that the answering 
party is 
coming from. If the party's perspective is in tune with the triple bottom line philosophy 
that is discussed in Young and MacRae (2002), which consists of corporations being 
judged for success in the financial, environmental, and community realms, then the 
answer to this is more inline with normative stakeholder theory; this party 
would argue 
that CSR should dictate that firm's fulfill the demands that their perspective 
stakeholders 
place upon them. On the other hand, if the answering party follows the logic 
of the 
McWilliams and Siegel's (2001) supply-demand model, then the answer to our main 
question lies more in tune with shareholder wealth maximization theory, 
namely that 
CSR considerations should only influence corporate decision making to the point 
that 
they increase the profitability of the firm. 
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3. The DSI 400 as a Proxy for CSR 
The relationship of CSR and corporate financial performance is still not 
clear. In 
this survey, there are eight studies that indicate a positive 
relationship, four that indicate 
a neutral relationship, and two that indicate a negative 
relationship (Note: Hillman and 
Kiem, 2001 indicates both a positive and a negative 
relationship, depending upon what 
type of CSR is being considered). The book on this is still not 
closed. There are several 
reasons for this. First, the addition that CSR may bring to 
shareholders' value is 
necessarily a long-term effect. The firm is arguably rewarded 
for CSR with a stronger 
commitment to the firm by its stakeholders. This is very difficult 
to value in a firm's 
financial statements. In addition is the difficulty in measuring 
CSR. As was previously 
discussed many different proxies have been used to measure 
CSR. Currently there is a 
need for more research on the validity of these proxies as valid 
measurements of CSR. 
In response to this, the last section is dedicated to analyzing 
the validity and usefulness 
of one of the most frequently used proxies for CSR, inclusion of a firm in 
the Domini 
Social Index (DSI) 400. 
The DSI 400, named for one of its founders Amy Domini, was created 
and is 
managed by the firm KI. D Research k Analytics, Inc. The firm began officially 
tracking the index on May I, 1990. The goal of the index is to "(reflect) the 
behavior of 
a portfolio of stocks in companies that a socially responsible investor 
might purchase" in 
order to "answer the question: How does the application of social 
criteria affect 
investment performance?"(KLD, corn). KLD is, by far, the most widely used and 
relied 
upon source for CSR data and the stocks included in the DSI 400 
are carefully selected. 
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In order to analyze the DS1400's validity as a proxy for CSR, a thorough analysis 
of 
how stocks are selected into the DSI 400 is required. Work began on the 
DSI 400 in late 
19g9 to create a stock index that would represent the portfolio of stocks that the typical 
socially sensitive investor might possess. In order to produce such an 
index, KLD came 
up with a system of screens that would eliminate any companies that did 
not meet a 
minimum level of CSR. The first set of screens is what KLD refers to as their 
"exclusionary screens". These screens eliminated companies that: 
~ Derive 2'yo or more of sales from military weapons systems. 
~ Derive any revenues from the manufacture of alcoholic or tobacco 
products, 
~ Derive any revenues from gaming products or services. 
~ Possessed equity interests in South Africa during the apartheid concern 
(screen was dropped in November 1993 when this concern was no longer 
relevant). 
~ Are electric utilities that own interest in nuclear power or derive 
electricity from nuclear power plants in which they have an interest. 
(Courtesy of Domini Social Investments) 
In addition, KLD developed a set of qualitative screens that "evaluated 
companies' 
records in areas such as the environment, diversity, employee relations 
and product 
(KLD has since added a qualitative screen dealing with non-U. S. operations and an 
"Other" category that addresses executive compensation issues, tax disputes, and 
companies that own a sizeable portion of a socially questionable company). KLD 
made 
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an effort to exclude companies whose records were, on balance, negative in these areas 
and to include companies whose records were, on balance, positive in these areas. 
Problems in one area did not automatically eliminate a company. KI. D instead sought to 
balance the mixed records of concerns and strengths that companies often have within 
these areas" (Domini. corn). The index was set at the common stock of 400 publicly 
traded corporations. To meet this 400, KI. D initially tumed these screens onto the S&P 
500. These standards eliminated approximately half of the S&P 500 from inclusion in 
the DSI 400 (KLD also eliminated S&P companies with stock prices below $5 per share 
and firms with serious financial troubles that caste doubt on their long-term viability). 
KLD then sought non-S&P companies with large market capitalization and industry 
representation and passed them through the same criteria. The DSI 400 acquired another 
100 corporations through this means. KLD then added 50 more companies known to 
possess "exceptional social characteristics" that also passed KLD's criteria to be 
included in the DSI 400. In monitoring companies KLD used (and continues to use) a 
broad range of sources, including the following: 
~ Annual reports, 10K forms, proxy statements, and quarterly reports. 
~ Specific issue reports. 
~ The business media (articles in Fortune, Business Weekly, Wall Street 
Journul, Forbes, etc. ), trade journals, and the general media. 
~ Relevant articles from periodicals such as Chronicle of Philanthropy. 
~ Regional Environmental Protection Agency Newsletters. 
~ Academic 
journals. 
~ The National I aw Review. 
~ Bxtemal Rankings such as Working Mother's listing ol thc best 
companies for women to work for, 
~ A yearly questionnaire sent by thc KLD staff to each company's investor 
relations oflice about CSR practices and a follow-up with those offices to 
assure accuracy. 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997) 
Since then, thc DSI 400 has continued to include a constant 400 companies. The 
index is market-weighted, similar to the S&P 500. KLD meets bi-monthly to review the 
companies in the index to determine if any company should be dropped from the DSI 
400 and, if so, what its replacement should be. One of the goals of KLD is to keep 
turnover of the DSI 400 to a minimum; it has averaged only a 6-8% turnover over the 
past five years. With this in mind, the most common reason for a company to be 
removed from the DSI 400 is because it ceases to exist. By this it is meant that the 
company is either acquired by another firm, split into two or more companies, has 
entered into bankruptcy proceedings, or has ceased to operate as its former entity. 
Despite KLD's low turnover, it must occasionally remove a stock from the DSI 400 for 
social reasons. Historically, no more than one or two companies have been removed per 
month for social reasons. If a company is removed for social reasons, KLD does not 
consider re-adding the company for two years. The screens by which companies are 
continuously evaluated after being admitted to the DSI 400 are almost identical to the 
original screens used to construct the index. The only difference lies in an adaptation of 
the screens to the current social conscious of the investing community. Changes to the 
screens were previously noted above. After admitted to the DSI 400, "if a company. . . 
becomes involved in an industry excluded from the DSI (through the exclusionary 
screens), KLD drops the company as soon as it can verify that the company violates the 
screen. KLD moves more cautiously in removing a company involved in a controversy 
covered by a qualitative screen. In such cases, KLD waits until it can determine whether 
a controversy is substantial and likely to persist for more than a year" (KLD Decision 
Series, "Starbucks' Relationship with Kraft Foods" ). In determining whether or not a 
concern covered under a qualitative screen is substantial enough to remove it from the 
DSI 400, KLD judges the problem along the following five factors: 
~ Magnitude of the problem. 
~ Company response. 
~ Patterns of problems at the company. 
~ Industry considerations. 
~ Casual link between product and problem. 
(KLD Decision Series, "Odwalla, Inc. , and the Domini Social Index 
Process" ) 
When a firm is involved with a controversy involving a qualitative issue, KLD uses 
these guidelines to judge whether or not the underlying problem behind that controversy 
is both substantial and long lasting in nature. KLD uses extreme discretion in removing 
companies from the DSI 400 for issues related to its qualitative screens. Since 1998, 
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KLD has only removed a total of fifteen companies from the DSI 400 for qualitative 
related reasons. 
This analysis leads to the meaning behind a firm's stock being in the DSI 400. 
The easiest way for a company to bc removed from the DSI 400 is to become involved 
with an industry prohibitively banned by the exclusionary screens. These industries 
include the production of alcohol, tobacco, military weapons, gambling, nuclear power, 
or (until November 1993) having equity interests in South Africa. This list represents 
the industries that the typical socially consciously investor would avoid. The qualitative 
screens are less concrete and rarely play a role in a company being removed from the 
DSI 400. A company will not be removed from the DSI 400 for qualitative reasons 
unless the controversy surrounding it is severe and long lasting, Such a controversy 
would likely be detrimental to a company's appearance to socially sensitive investors 
and would thus be avoided. The effect of a mild controversy is less determinable and 
does not play a part in this analysis. In short, the companies whose stocks make up the 
DSI 400 are those companies that are not avoided for social reasons by socially 
conscious investors. This is the meaning behind the DSI 400. 
For our purposes as a proxy for CSR, the DSI 400 should possess three qualities. 
It should be highly accepted, universally applicable, and posses valid meaning. The 
term "highly accepted" is self-explanatory and refers to the proxy's broad use and 
acceptance by the academic community. Abramson and Chung (2000), D'Antonio, 
Johnssen, and Hutton (I 998), Statman (2000), McWilliams and Siegel (2000), and 
others have all specifically used inclusion on the DSI 400 as a proxy for CSR. It is 
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assumed, therefore, that this criterion is met. The proxy, for our purposes, should also 
be universally applicable. 'I'here is much academic debate on this. Carroll (2000) 
argues that in order for a measure to be called CSR, it should necessarily include all 
facets of CSR. However, Rowley and Berman (2000) argue that multidimensional 
constructs, such as the DSI 400, necessarily skew conclusions drawn upon them because 
'by aggregating multiple dimensions into a composite measure, much of the meaning 
and riclmess in the data is lost" (p. 403). Ruf, Muralidhar, and Paul (2001) also 
comment on the inaccuracies created by using a single measure to accommodate for a 
multidimensional construct and propose a measure of CSR based upon the managerial 
concept of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. The goal of this study is to answer the 
question, "How does CSR impact the corporate decision making process?*' This 
question is asked in a general sense, in hopes that it will provide corporate executives 
guidance in discerning between available alternatives in choosing where to allocate 
corporate assets. Because this question is asked in a general sense, we seek must seek a 
proxy that includes all aspects of CSR. The ability to determine whether or not CSR is 
related to CFP in narrower contexts, which would necessitate a more specific proxy, is 
available, but such a revelation would provide little guidance in analyzing CSR's overall 
role in the corporate decision making process. Our ideal proxy, therefore, must be 
universally applicable. Because of the consideration of such a large range of issues 
(everything from alcohol to diversity), assuming universal application of the DSI 400 is 
appropriate. 
42 
Our ideal proxy must also possess valid meaning. By this, I simply mean that 
our proxy must indicate a firm's level of CSR; companies in the DSI 400 should be 
distinctively more socially responsible than companies not in the DSI 400. By using 
inclusion in the DSI 400 as a proxy for CSR, as McWiliiams and Siegel (2000) does, v e 
rely on this to be true for the DSI 400. To determine the validity of the DSI 400 as an 
appropriate CSR proxy, a difference of means test is performed on companies in the DSI 
400 against companies not in the DSI 400. Our data set is all available CSR data by 
KLD from 1991-1996. Below is a table listing the number of companies that KLD 






























It should be noted that because KLD keeps a continuous 400 companies in the 
DSI 400, in each of the above years, four hundred of the companies would be expected 
to be in the DSI 400; the remainder we would expect to be "Non-DSI companies". 
However, within our empirical analysis, it was discovered that for 1993 and 1994 only 
399 companies out of our data were in the DSI 400; the remaining balance were "non- 
DSI companies". It could be possible that our data is incomplete or that this is due to a 
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clerical error. Nonetheless, within our data set of more than 640 companies for each 
year, it is assumed that the given data is adequate to determine any differences between 
companies in the DSI 400 ("DSI companies") and companies not in the DSI 400 ("Non- 
DSI companies"). 
The data used are the scorings published by KLD. KLD scores the following on 
a scale of — 2 to+2: 
~ Community Relations (1991-1996) 
~ Diversity (1995-1996) 
~ L'mployee Relations (1991-1996) 
~ Environment (1991-1996) 
~ Non-U. S. Operations (1994-1996) 
~ Product (1991-1996) 
~ Women & Minority 'I reatment (1991-1994) 
~ Other (1991-1996) 
These are the same criteria used as qualitative screens in creating the DSI 400. The 
"Other" category contains such items as executive compensation issues, tax issues, and 
ownership concerns. The years listed beside each category list the years in which KLD 
assessed companies on that particular attribute. KLD attempts to continually adjust its 
methods to make them more accurately portray the values of society. For instance, in 
1995 KLD switched from assessing companies on their treatment of women and 
minorities and began assessing companies on the overall level of diversity present in 
their workforce. This is a subtle change but onc that more accurately refiects the views 
of society. These items correspond to the qualitative screens as discussed above. 
In addition, KLD scores the following from a scale of — 2 to 0: 
~ Alcohol, Gambling, 6'r. Tobacco (1995-1996) 
Military Contracting (1991-1996) 
~ Nuclear Power (1991-1996) 
Investment in South Africa (1991-1993) 
These are the same criteria used as exclusionary screens in creating the DSI 400. The 
significance of not assigning positive scores to these categories is that it is KLD's belief 
that participation in any of these activities can only have a negative affect on a 
company's relationship to society. Again the years listed represent the years in which 
KLD assessed each particular attribute. 
A difference of means test was chosen because it presented the simplest method 
for ascertaining a significant difference between DSI companies and non-DSI 
companies. If the DSI 400 truly stands as a valid proxy for CSR then it should stand 
that DSI companies should score significantly better (i. e. more positively) than non-DSI 
companies. As can be seen in the data below, this is the case. 
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Com. Rel. Diversity Emp. Rel. Environment 
DSI 0. 4491 0 3775 0 2636 0 1076 
Non-DSI 0. 2840 0. 1566 -0. 1098 -0 5084 
Difference 0. 1651 0. 2209 0. 3734 0 6160 
Non-US Ops. Product W8 M Other 
DSI -0, 0067 0 1068 0. 2322 -0. 1439 
Non-DSI -0. 0836 -0. 4039 0. 0693 -0. 3436 
Difference 0. 0769 0 5106 0. 1628 0. 1997 
AGT Military Nuclear S. Africa 
DSI -0. 0025 -0. 0471 -0. 0054 -0 0108 
Non-DSI -0. 1205 -0. 4849 -0. 2405 -0. 4820 
Difference 0. 1180 0. 4378 0. 2350 0. 4712 
The data shows that in every single attribute, DSI companies perform 
significantly better than non-DSI companies. This is what we were expecting. Using 
the DSI scores we have determined that the companies in the DSI 400, at least from 
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1991-1996, were significantly more socially responsible than companies not in thc DSI 
400. From this data, we can conclude that a company's designation as being in ihc DSI 
400 implies a certain minimum level of CSR that is higher than the minimum level of 
CSR expected from a company that is not on the DSI 400. This opens the door for 
future research using the DSI 400 as a valid proxy for CSR. 
Also worth discussion is the selection of attributes in which the difference 
between the mean of the DSI companies was significantly higher than the Non-DSI 
companies. This was especially seen in the following attributes: environmental issues, 
product issues, military contracting issues, and issues pertaining to South Africa. It can 
be assumed that from this we can gather that these issues were taken up most frequently 
by DSI companies as important CSR initiatives. In contrast to this, those issues that 
demonstrate a particularly low difference are Non-US operations, alcohol/ gambling/ 
tobacco, treatment of women and minorities, and community relations. It can be 
concluded that corporations did not consider signifying themselves as leaders in these 
areas was as important as signifying themselves as leaders in the high difference issues. 
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
Because of the mass of information contained in this study, I will begin by 
highlighting the key points. The overall goal of this study has been to investigate the 
role that CSR plays in corporate decision-making. What we saw was that this answer 
depends on the frame of reference of the one answering this. A three-tiered theoretical 
model is proposed to classify the differing schools of thought on this issue. In this 
model, the two purely theoretical views are normative stakeholder theory and 
shareholder wealth maximization theory. Normative stakeholder theory believes that 
corporations must fulfill the demands that society places upon it. These demands are 
seen through the corporation's many stakeholders. Opposed to this, shareholder wealth 
maximization theory argues that managers should see the maximization of the 
corporation's value as their only objective. Assumed is that by seeking to maximize its 
own value, the corporation is leaving society better off. From these two theoretical 
bases, we moved to the more application-based strategic stakeholder theory, which 
recognizes a tradeoff between financial and non-financial stakeholders and acts 
according to this tradeoff. Of particular interest were the strategic stakeholder theory 
studies that sought to discover the relationship between CSR and firm financial 
performance. There is not yet a substantial conclusion on the relationship between CSR 
and financial performance. One reason for this is a lack of research on an appropriate 
CSR proxy. In accordance to this, this study ended with an evaluation of the DSI 400 as 
a proxy for CSR. It was concluded that the DSI 400 stood as a valid proxy for CSR. 
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'I he concept of corporate social responsibility is both highly ambiguous and 
extremely dependent on the individual. My definition of CSR is no doubt different than 
yours. My beliefs are completely based off of my perceptions and past experiences, as 
are yours off of your perceptions and past experiences. This makes the study of CSR 
cxtrcmely difficult, but not impossible. The model proposed in this study allows all 
beliefs to be understood in the context of our theoretical bases, normative stakeholder 
theory and shareholder wealth maximization theory. Therefore, it is imperative to 
understand the differences that separate these two beliefs. 'fhe fundamental difference is 
the assumption by shareholder wealth maximization theory that a corporation by seeking 
its own maximum value, leaves society better off. Advocates of normative stakeholder 
theory do not share this assumption. 
1 his, of course, leads to a study of the relationship of CSR and firm financial 
performance. If a corporation benefits society by seeking its own financial ends, then it 
stands to reason that a positive relationship should exist between CSR and firm financial 
performance. If there is no such relationship, serious doubt is cast on this assumption 
and, likewise, on shareholder wealth maximization theory. One problem was there is 
currently a lack of research on CSR proxies. In response to this, a difference of means 
test was applied to companies in the DSI 400 from 1991-1996 against companies not in 
the DSI 400 according to CSR scores given by KLD. Our results lead to the conclusion 
that the DSI 400 stands as a valid proxy of CSR. 
This study is merely the first step. More research is needed on the relationship 
between CSR and firm financial performance. This study merely gives justification for 
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using the DSI 400 as a proxy for CSR. Future studies should use this information to 
continue to explore the relationship between CSR and financial performance in order to 
make future conclusions on the role of CSR in corporate decision-making. 
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